Distinct Patterns of Cognitive Conflict Dynamics in Promise Keepers and Promise Breakers by Calluso, Cinzia et al.
fpsyg-09-00939 June 7, 2018 Time: 17:39 # 1
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 11 June 2018
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00939
Edited by:
Andrew S. Kayser,
University of California,
San Francisco, United States
Reviewed by:
Lusha Zhu,
Peking University, China
Aleksei Yurievich Egorov,
Institute of Evolutionary Physiology
and Biochemistry (RAS), Russia
*Correspondence:
Cinzia Calluso
ccalluso@luiss.it
†These authors have contributed
equally by first authors.
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Decision Neuroscience,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 29 September 2017
Accepted: 22 May 2018
Published: 11 June 2018
Citation:
Calluso C, Saulin A, Baumgartner T
and Knoch D (2018) Distinct Patterns
of Cognitive Conflict Dynamics
in Promise Keepers and Promise
Breakers. Front. Psychol. 9:939.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00939
Distinct Patterns of Cognitive
Conflict Dynamics in Promise
Keepers and Promise Breakers
Cinzia Calluso1,2*†, Anne Saulin1†, Thomas Baumgartner1 and Daria Knoch1
1 Department of Social Psychology and Social Neuroscience, Institute of Psychology, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland,
2 Department of Business and Management, LUISS Guido Carli University, Rome, Italy
On a daily basis, we see how different people can be in keeping or breaking a given
promise. However, we know very little about the cognitive conflict dynamics that underlie
the decision to keep or break a promise and whether this is shaped by inter-individual
variability. In order to fill this gap, we applied an ecologically valid promise decision
task with real monetary consequences for all involved interaction partners and used
mouse tracking to identify the dynamic, on-line cognitive processes that underlie the
decision to keep or break a promise. Our findings revealed that on average, the process
of breaking a promise is associated with largely curved mouse trajectories, while the
process of keeping a promise was not, indicating that breaking a promise is associated
with a larger conflict. Interestingly, however, this conflict pattern was strongly shaped by
individual differences. Individuals who always kept their promises did not show any signs
of conflict (i.e., straight mouse trajectories), indicating that they were not tempted by the
monetary benefits associated with breaking the promise. In contrast, individuals who did
not always keep their promise exhibited a large conflict (i.e., curved mouse trajectories),
irrespective of whether they broke or kept their promise. A possible interpretation of
these findings is that these individuals were always tempted by the unchosen decision
option – the desire to act in a fair manner when breaking the promise and the monetary
benefits when keeping the promise. This study provides the first piece of evidence
that there are substantial inter-individual differences in cognitive conflict dynamics that
underlie the decision to keep or break promises and that mouse tracking is able to
illuminate important insights into individual differences in complex human’s decision
processes.
Keywords: mouse kinematics, cognitive conflict, social decision-making, promise, inter-individual variability
INTRODUCTION
Promises are very common in everyday life and foster social cooperation as well as trust between
people (Chen, 2000; Beauchamp, 2003; Friedrich and Southwood, 2011). The role of promises
can be traced back to ancient times, when cooperative infrastructures (i.e., laws, courts or police)
did not exist, and more basic forms of cooperation agreements where needed to foster trust
and partnership in human societies (Fried, 2015). Indeed, economic game studies have found
that pre-play communication, i.e., a statement of intent or promise to cooperate, increases
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the subsequent levels of cooperative behavior (Charness and
Dufwenberg, 2006, 2008, 2010; Vanberg, 2008; Battigalli et al.,
2013). However, promises cannot only be kept, but also broken.
When people face situations in which breaking a promise results
in some kind of profit, they may experience a conflict between
the temptation to behave selfishly in order to gain a (monetary)
benefit on the one hand, and the desire to act in a fair manner
on the other. However, there is a large heterogeneity in people’s
propensity to follow through on promises that is not well
understood. In particular, we know very little about the cognitive
conflict dynamics that underlie the decision to keep or break
promises.
In order to fill this gap, we need a technique that allows for
measuring a potential conflict associated with an individual’s
promise keeping and promise breaking decisions. Here, we used
mouse tracking because this method continuously tracks the
movement of the mouse cursor during the decision process with
a fine graded temporal and spatial sensitivity, enabling inferences
about cognitive processes during the formation of a decision that
are otherwise not observable (Spivey, 2007; Song and Nakayama,
2009; Freeman et al., 2011a).
Although this technique may sometimes be difficult to
adopt when studying complex social and psychological research
questions (Hehman et al., 2015), an increasing number of
studies has applied this method to study the cognitive
dynamics of social behavior (Freeman et al., 2008, 2010,
2011b; Duran et al., 2010; Tabatabaeian et al., 2015). These
studies show that it is possible to exploit the mouse tracking
technique also for these more complex psychological processes
because of its ability to reflect the unfolding of an inner
cognitive conflict regardless of its exact nature (Freeman et al.,
2011a).
As such, this measure of a continuous stream of motor outputs
represents a unique tool to determine whether the cognitive
process leading to the selection of one of two decision options
(e.g., keeping or breaking a promise) is characterized by a conflict
and to identify the conflict pattern. A conflict would be indicated
by a movement of the mouse cursor that shows attraction (i.e., a
curved trajectory) toward the unselected decision option while
moving the mouse toward the decision option that is finally
selected (Hehman et al., 2015).
We hypothesized three possible patterns of results (see
Figure 1 for visualization). Firstly, the conflict associated with
keeping vs. breaking a promise may mainly be driven by the
desire to act in a fair manner. That means all mouse trajectories
associated with breaking a promise should be sharply curved,
indicating a high attraction toward the promise keeping option,
while all promise keeping responses should yield fairly straight
mouse trajectories (i.e., the option to keep the promise is favored
by the cognitive process; Pattern 1). Secondly, it may be exactly
the other way around. That is, the conflict arises from the
temptation to gain a higher monetary outcome implying that the
cognitive process favors the option to break the promise (Pattern
2). Thirdly, the cognitive process may not be characterized
in terms of favoring either option at all. Instead, it may be
characterized by a decision process that is always attracted by
the unselected decision option, indicating a conflicting decision
process when keeping and breaking the promise (Pattern 3).
Importantly, if inter-individual variability shapes the decision
process, different participants may in fact show different process
patterns. That is, some people may for example show Pattern 1,
and others Pattern 2 or 3.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Forty-eight right-handed and healthy students (27 females) from
the University of Bern took part in the study. They had a mean
handedness score of 13.51 (SD ± 2.30; in the scale used in this
study a score of 13 can be interpreted as 100% right-handedness
and a score of 39 as 100% left-handedness, see Chapman and
Chapman, 1987). The final sample comprised 47 participants
after the exclusion of one male participant due to technical
problems in data recording. This study was approved by the local
ethics committee of the Faculty of Human Sciences (University of
Bern, Switzerland, Nr. 2015-11-00003). All subjects gave written
informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki,
and were informed of their right to discontinue participation
at any time. Participants received 20 Swiss francs (CHF) for
participating in addition to the money earned during the Promise
Decision task.
FIGURE 1 | Possible mouse tracking outcomes depending on the source of conflict. According to Pattern 1 conflict mainly arises from the desire to act in adherence
to fairness norms, resulting in a strong tendency toward the “YES” response (keeping the promise). According to Pattern 2, the conflict is mainly driven by the
temptation to gain (monetary) benefits, resulting in a strong tendency toward the “NO” response (breaking the promise). Finally, according to Pattern 3, trajectories
show signs of conflict when participants keep and break the promise, resulting in curved trajectories during both decision processes. The process patterns,
however, may be influenced by inter-individual variability.
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Promise Decision Task
The paradigm used in this study is a Promise Decision task,
developed to explore promise keeping and promise breaking
decisions in an ecologically valid situation with real consequences
for all involved interaction partners (Baumgartner et al., 2009,
2013). One trial in this task involves two anonymously interacting
participants, one in the role of an investor and one in the role
of a trustee. For the purpose of this study, we focused on the
role of the trustee because only participants in this role can
keep or break promises. The trustee has to make a promise
prior to a series of three subsequent payback trials. The trustee
indicates whether he/she plans to “always” or “sometimes” share
the available money with the investor. At the beginning of each
payback trial, the investor receives an endowment of 2 monetary
units (MUs, 1 MU= 0.5 CHF) and is informed about the trustee’s
promise decision. Based on this information the investor has to
decide whether he/she wants to trust the trustee by investing
his/her endowment, or whether to keep it for him/herself. If the
investor decides to keep the endowment, he/she receives 2 MUs
while the trustee receives nothing. Conversely, if the investor
decides to send the money to the trustee, the experimenter
multiplies the amount by five. Thus, the trustee receives 10
MUs. He/she can now decide whether to pay back half of the
money to the investor or not (payback trials). If he/she decides
to actually pay back half of the money, the investor and the
trustee each earn 5 MUs. However, if the trustee decides to keep
the money the trustee earns 10 MUs and the investor earns
nothing.
Participants gave their promises prior to three subsequent
payback trials eight times, resulting in a total of 24 payback trials
for the participants in the role of the trustee (for visualization
of one payback trial, see Figure 2). These payback trials were
played with different, anonymous interaction partners in the role
of an investor in order to exclude reputation effects and strategic
spillovers across payback trials. Unknown to the participants, the
decisions of the investors were preselected based on a pilot study
in order to make sure that all participants experienced the same
amounts of trusting decisions of the investors. Of the 24 payback
trials, 3 trials were decisions in which the investors did not trust
the trustee and thus the participants could not make a payback
decision in these trials. At the end of the experiment, four trials
were randomly selected and the sum earned in these trials was
paid in addition to the show-up fee. The experiment was run
in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and interfaced with the software
package OpenSesame (Mathôt et al., 2012) in order to allow for
the recording of mouse movements (sampling rate = 100 Hz).
To ensure a proper recording of mouse movements, participants
were instructed to press a start button, positioned at the bottom
center of the screen. Then participants were free to choose
a decision option by clicking on the corresponding response
button. Participants were also explicitly instructed to begin their
movements early and were warned after slow trials (movement
started later than 1500 ms after trial onset). The response
buttons were equidistantly positioned from the start button at
the top left and top right of the screen. The mapping between
response options and response positions was counterbalanced
across participants. Please see Figure 2 for an example of a
payback trial.
Data Analysis
Kinematics and Temporal Indices
Mouse trajectories (x- and y- coordinates) associated with
participants’ choices were recorded at a sampling rate of 100 Hz
during the payback decision. Due to differences in response
times, each trial resulted in a different number of x-y-coordinate
pairs. To account for these differences, trajectories were time-
normalized prior to statistical analyses using a publicly available
python code (Travers, 2013) which is based on a standard routine
(Spivey, 2007; Freeman et al., 2011a). In that vein, trajectories
were first rescaled into a standard coordinate space. In this
new space, the top-left corner of the screen corresponds to
“−1; 1.5”, the top-right corner to “1; 1.5”, and the position of
the start button to “0, 0”. Then the duration of the trajectory
movements was normalized by re-sampling the time vector into
101 time-bins using linear interpolation to allow averaging and
comparisons across multiple trials. Additionally, the endpoints of
all trajectories were flipped in the same direction (i.e., toward the
right-side response button). These normalized trajectories were
used to compute two parameters based on the mouse trajectories:
the maximum deviation (MD) and the area under the curve
(AUC). The MD is the largest perpendicular deviation between
the real trajectory and the theoretical trajectory (i.e., straight
FIGURE 2 | Depicted is one payback trial of the Promise Decision task from the trustee’s perspective. Each payback trial started with an information screen that
informed the trustee about the investor’s decision. In case that the investor invested the two MUs, a start screen appeared and the trustee had to press the “START”
button. After clicking the “START” button, the trustee was reminded of his/her promise and was asked whether he/she wants to pay back half of the MUs. The
trustee then had to decide whether he/she actually wants to pay back (“YES”) or not (“NO”) by moving the mouse toward and finally clicking on the corresponding
decision option at the top of the decision screen. Each participant completed a total of 24 such payback trials that were played with different and anonymous
investors.
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line connecting each trajectory’s start and endpoints) out of all
time steps. The AUC is the geometric area between the real and
theoretical trajectory. Although these two measures are different
from a mathematical and geometrical standpoint, they both
provide an index of spatial attraction toward the concurrent not-
selected option (i.e., high values of MD and AUC indicate a
high spatial attraction by the unselected response option while
moving the mouse toward the selected option) (Spivey, 2007;
Freeman and Ambady, 2010; Freeman et al., 2011a). Further,
prior studies have shown no change in the results if MD and AUC
are interchangeably used (Freeman et al., 2008; Calluso et al.,
2015).
In addition, a series of temporal measures were computed.
Firstly, the response time (in ms) denotes the time from the
moment the start button was clicked until the response was given.
Secondly, the initiation time (in ms) is the amount of time from
the moment the participant clicked on the start button until they
actually initiated the movement of the mouse cursor. Finally, the
motion time (in ms) is calculated as the amount of time after
the mouse movement was initiated until the participant clicked
on the final answer. It is important to note that even if the
traditional response time measure includes both the initiation
and motion times, these three measures reflect different times at
which uncertainty/conflict may become apparent. For example,
if conflict arises during early stages of processing, it would be
reflected by longer latencies in initiation time, while later on in
the decision process it would be reflected in the motion time (e.g.,
because of a high number of changes in direction).
Statistical Analysis
We focused in our analyses on payback trials that were preceded
by an always promise because deciding to not pay back after an
always promise can unambiguously be identified as breaking a
promise and deciding to pay back after an always promise can
unambiguously be identified as keeping a promise. Conversely,
when a participant promised to sometimes pay back it is not clear
whether keeping this promise corresponds to paying back once
or paying back twice in the three trials following that promise
and thus it is not possible to unambiguously identify keep and
break trials. Thus, we focused on the clearly interpretable payback
decisions that followed always promises. In this regard, please
note that the majority of payback trials (75%) were preceded by
an always promise. Payback trials were first classified as keep or
break trials. Keep trials were those trials in which participants first
promised to always pay back and then decided to return half of
the MUs to the investors (i.e., always – yes responses). In contrast,
break trials were those trials in which participants promised to
always return half of the MUs but then they decided not to follow
through on that promise (i.e., always – no responses). Further, for
every participant, the return rate (total percentage of keep trials
following an always promise) was calculated as an index of the
overall payback behavior.
In a next step, a series of linear mixed-effects models analyses
with fully specified random effects structure were conducted,
independently using mouse kinematics (MD and AUC) as well
as the temporal measures (response time, moving time, initiation
time) as dependent variables, while the response type (break vs.
keep trials) was used as fixed effect. This approach allows us
to account for potential inter-individual differences in baseline
motor behavior. Further, because 23 of the 47 participants showed
no variance in their responses (they decided to keep their promise
in 100% of the trials) we conducted an additional series of linear
mixed-effect models (LMMs) analyses with the same structure
described above, discarding this subgroup of participants.
In order to elucidate the role of inter-individual variability
in overall behavior regarding the potential conflict involved in
promise keeping vs. promise breaking the sample was divided
into two groups based on the individual return rate. The first
group comprised those participants whose return rate was equal
to 100%, i.e., participants who kept their promise of always paying
back in 100% of the payback trials (promise keepers; N = 23). The
second group comprised all those participants who did not always
keep their promise of always paying back, i.e., their return rate
was lower than 100% (promise breakers; N = 24). To test whether
these two groups differ with respect to their promise behavior,
a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the percentage
of always and sometimes promises, using the promise (always
vs. sometimes) as within-subject factor, and the group (promise
keepers vs. promise breakers) as between-subject factor.
In a series of LMM analyses, the kinematics and temporal
measures associated with keep trials of promise keepers were
compared to those associated with keep and break trials of
promise breakers. Notably, three of the twenty-four promise
breakers never kept their promises across the entire experiment
(return rate m= 0%). Thus, these three participants could not be
included in the analysis that comprised keep trials. These analyses
were conducted using the kinematics and temporal measures as
dependent variables, while the group (i.e., promise breakers vs.
promise keepers) was included as fixed effect. Analyses were run
separately for each dependent variable.
Additionally, to pin down the pattern of conflict in promise
breakers, we compared keep and break trials in this group of
participants (N = 21). Hence, a series of LMMs analyses was
conducted on the kinematics and temporal measures, using the
response type (break vs. keep trials) as fixed effect. Again, three of
the twenty-four participants belonging to the group of promise
breakers had to be excluded from this analysis because they never
kept their promises (return rate m = 0%). Since the group of
promise breakers yielded a large inter-individual variability with
respect to the individuals’ return rates, we conducted additional
follow-up LLMs analyses which were restricted to those promise
breakers who displayed a comparable amount of promise keep
and break decisions (return rate: m= 56%± 11%, N = 14).
All the LMMs analyses described in this section were
conducted using the intercepts for subjects, trials, as well as the
random slopes of the fixed effects as random effects.
Finally, since promise breakers are characterized by large
inter-individual variability, an additional set of analyses was
conducted to elucidate whether the frequency of promise keeping
decisions (i.e., return rate) had an impact on the curvature of
mouse trajectories associated with keep and break trials. In that
vein, we first computed an index of cognitive conflict for each
of the kinematics measures (i.e., MD and AUC). This index was
calculated as the difference between the MD/AUC associated with
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the break trials minus the one associated with keep trials [i.e.,
MD index = MD break – MD keep; AUC index = AUC break – AUC
keep]. Then, robust linear regressions (Holland and Welsch, 1977;
O’Leary, 1990) were conducted independently using the MD and
AUC indices as dependent variables, and the return rate as a
regressor. Again, three of the twenty-four participants belonging
to the group of promise breakers had to be excluded from these
analyses because they never kept their promises (return rate
m = 0%), thus, these analyses were conducted on 21 promise
breakers.
All the LMM analyses described above were also conducted
controlling for possible gender effects. Thus, we re-ran all LLM
analyses and added gender as a covariate. Further, an additional
series of analyses was conducted to test whether gender may
moderate the effect of response type (break vs. keep trials) or
group (promise breakers vs. promise keepers) on the kinematics
and temporal measures. To this aim, a series of LMM analyses was
conducted including a gender by group or gender by trial type
(keep vs. break) interaction term (in these analyses gender was
also included as a single predictor). Notably, all findings reported
in the paper hold if we control for gender in our analyses.
Furthermore, there is also no evidence for an interaction effect.
All p-values of the interaction terms of gender by trial type or
gender by group are not significant (all p> 0.13).
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
The participants choose the always promise (m = 75%) with
higher frequency than the sometimes promise (m = 25%;
t= 5.75, p< 0.001). Furthermore, participants exhibited a higher
number of yes (keep) compared to no (break) decisions when
they had promised to always pay back [always – yes (m = 61
%) vs. always – no (m = 14%); p < 0.001]. Conversely, this
difference was not observed when participants had promised to
sometimes pay back [sometimes – yes (m = 12%) vs. sometimes –
no (m= 13%); p= 0.9, see Figure 3].
The following mouse tracking analyses focus on those payback
trials that were preceded by an always promise because only
these trials can be unambiguously classified as promise keeping
or promise breaking trials.
Testing for the Existence of a Conflict
In a first step, we investigated whether there exists a conflict
at all when participants decide whether to keep or break a
promise. Hence, we tested whether the mouse trajectory during
the decision to pay back or not was significantly associated
with the decision outcome (i.e., response type: keeping the
promise vs. breaking the promise). In that vein, we used a
series of LMMs analyses with the mouse kinematics (i.e., MD,
AUC) and temporal measures (i.e., response time, initiation time,
and motion time) as dependent variables and response type
as independent variable (for details, see methods section). The
analyses revealed that response type was significantly associated
with both the MD (β = −0.05, p < 0.001) and the AUC
(β = −0.05, p < 0.001), indicating that break trials were
associated with a stronger tendency toward the unselected
response compared to keep trials (Figure 4). Such findings are
in line with the hypothesized Pattern 1 (see Figure 1), indicating
a stronger conflict when breaking a promise compared to when
keeping a promise. That said, these results support the existence
of a conflict during the decision whether to keep or break
a promise and the cognitive process underlying this conflict
appears to favor the option to keep the promise.
It is interesting to note that none of the temporal measures
(response time: p = 0.77, initiation time: p = 0.69, motion time:
p= 0.58) were able to significantly model the response type. Thus,
if we only had acquired response time data, we would not have
been able to detect the conflict in break trials. An overview of
the results for the linear mixed-effects analyses conducted on the
kinematic and temporal measures is provided in Table 1.
Interestingly, the same results were also replicated in the
LLM analyses conducted excluding the 23 trustees characterized
by no variance in their decision (i.e., return rate = 100%).
FIGURE 3 | Average percentages of keep (green bars) and break (red bars) decisions as a function of promise decisions (“ALWAYS” vs. “SOMETIMES”). Overall,
75% of the promise decisions were “ALWAYS” decisions whereas 25% were “SOMETIMES” decisions.
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FIGURE 4 | Mean mouse trajectories associated with keep trials (i.e., promise:
always; payback: yes; green line) and break trials (i.e., promise: always;
payback: no; red line). The trajectories were normalized into a standard space
and flipped into the same direction prior to statistical analyses. The point (0, 0)
corresponds to the position of the “START” button and the point (1, 1.5) to the
decision button (i.e., “YES” or “NO”). One can see that on average, break trials
are associated with a larger Maximum Deviation than keep trials.
TABLE 1 | Overview of the results of the mixed-effect models analyses testing the
effect of response type (keep vs. break trials) on the kinematic and temporal
measures.
Response type
Coeff. SE t value p-value
Maximum Deviation −0.05 0.02 −3.35 < 0.001
Area Under the Curve −0.05 0.02 −3.41 < 0.001
Response time −20.18 67.75 −0.30 0.77
Initiation time 7.17 18.17 0.39 0.69
Motion time −3E+01 6E+01 −6E−01 0.58
Coefficient estimates from mixed-effects models.
Indeed, as in the previous analyses, findings revealed a significant
effect of response type on MD (β = −0.05, p < 0.01) and
AUC (β = −0.05, p < 0.01), while no significant results were
found for the temporal measures (response time: p = 0.94;
initiation time: p = 0.50; motion time: p = 0.75). An overview
of the results for the linear mixed-effect models analyses
conducted on the kinematic and temporal measures is provided
in Table 2.
Conflict During the Decision Shaped by
Inter-individual Differences
The results obtained in the previous analyses suggest that (i)
a conflict exists when people are faced with the decision to
keep or break a given promise, and (ii) the cognitive process
associated with this conflict favors the option to keep the promise.
However, it remains an open question whether everyone has
the same conflict pattern or whether this conflict pattern is
TABLE 2 | Overview of the results of the mixed-effect models analyses testing the
effect of response type (keep vs. break trials) on the kinematic and temporal
measures, excluding the 23 trustees that showed no variance in their decision.
Response type
Coeff. SE t value p-value
Maximum Deviation −0.05 0.01 −2.99 < 0.01
Area Under the Curve −0.05 0.01 −3.00 < 0.01
Response time −5.56 75.01 −0.07 0.94
Initiation time 15.33 22.77 0.67 0.50
Motion time −20.99 66.06 −0.31 0.75
Coefficient estimates from mixed-effects models.
shaped by inter-individual differences. In order to answer this
question, participants were divided, based on their return rate,
in two groups: promise keepers (return rate = 100%; Figure 5
green line) and promise breakers (return rate = 58% ± 28%;
Figure 5 red line). In a first analysis, a repeated measures
ANOVA was conducted to check whether promise keepers and
promise breakers differ in their chosen promise level. The results
showed a significant main effect of promise (always > sometimes;
F1,45 = 33.00, p < 0.001). Importantly however, no promise by
group interaction was observed (F1,45 = 1.52, p = 0.22). This
finding indicates that promise keepers and promise breakers did
not differ in the chosen promise level (both groups chose “always”
most of the time). Thus, differences in keep and break decisions
and conflict patterns cannot be attributed to differences in the
chosen promise level.
Thus, in the following, mouse trajectories and temporal
measures of promise keepers and promise breakers were
compared by conducting a series of LMM analyses. Please note
that a comparison of break trials in promise keepers and break
trials in promise breakers is not possible since promise keepers
do not have break trials.
In a first step, keep trials of promise keepers and keep trials of
promise breakers were compared. Note that three of the twenty-
four participants in the group of promise breakers could not be
included in these analyses because they never kept their promise
(i.e., they do not have any keep trials). The results revealed that
FIGURE 5 | Mean return rate of promise keepers (green line) and promise
breakers (red line).
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the two groups significantly differed in both kinematic measures
(MD: β = −0.05, p < 0.05; AUC: β = −0.05, p < 0.05, see
Figure 6A), indicating that promise breakers yielded a stronger
conflict than promise keepers, even when keeping their promise.
Along the same lines, within the temporal measures, a significant
group effect was observed in the response time (β = −325.20,
p < 0.05), in the initiation time (β = −74.59, p < 0.01) and in
the motion time (β = −243.99, p < 0.05). These results suggest
that promise breakers were characterized by higher curvature,
higher hesitation, longer motion and response times, even when
they kept the promise given beforehand (Figure 6B). The detailed
results of these analyses are reported in Table 3.
In a second step, keep trials of promise keepers and break
trials of promise breakers were compared (in these analyses all
twenty-four participants in the group of promise breakers were
included). The results revealed that the two groups significantly
differed in both kinematic measures (MD: β = −0.12, p < 0.01;
AUC: β = −0.13, p < 0.01) (Figure 6C). That is, promise
breakers yielded a stronger conflict when breaking their promise
compared to promise keepers when keeping their promise.
Within the temporal measures, a nearly significant group effect
was observed in the response time (β=−309.90, p= 0.09), while
no group effect was observed in the initiation time (β=−309.90,
p = 0.30) and in the motion time (β = −230.80, p = 0.13). This
means that promise breakers displayed more curved trajectories
TABLE 3 | Overview of the results of the mixed-effect models analyses testing the
effect of group (promise keepers vs. promise breakers) on the kinematics and
temporal measures associated with keep trials.
Group: Promise Keepers vs. Promise Breakers
Coeff. SE t value p-value
Maximum Deviation −0.05 0.02 −2.08 < 0.05
Area Under the Curve −0.05 0.03 −2.07 < 0.05
Response time −325.20 133.00 −2.45 < 0.05
Initiation time −74.59 22.41 −3.33 < 0.01
Motion time −243.99 113.97 −2.14 < 0.05
Coefficient estimates from mixed-effects models.
FIGURE 6 | (A) Results of the LMM analysis conducted to compare the MD associated with keep trials of promise keepers (N = 23) vs. keep trials of promise
breakers (N = 21). (B) Mean mouse trajectories of keep trials of promise keepers (green line) and keep trials of promise breakers (orange line). (C) Results of the LMM
analysis conducted to compare the MD associated with keep trials of promise keepers (N = 23) vs. break trials of promise breakers (N = 24). (D) Mean mouse
trajectories of keep trials of promise keepers (green line) and break trials of promise breakers (red line). Statistically significant (p < 0.05) comparisons are marked by
an asterisk.
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(i.e., stronger conflict) and longer response times when breaking a
promise. Conversely, participants who always kept their promise
displayed straight trajectories (corresponding to Pattern 1) and
faster response times (Figure 6D). The detailed results of these
analyses are reported in Table 4.
Conflict in Promise Breakers
The previous analyses showed that participants in the group of
promise keepers did not show significant signs of conflict or
hesitation during their decision to keep the promise, whereas
promise breakers showed significantly higher level of conflict
both when keeping and breaking a promise. However, it remains
open whether these participants experience an equally large
conflict when they break a promise compared to when they keep
it. In a final step, to pin down the source of conflict in this
group of participants (Figure 5, red line), the effect of response
type (i.e., keep and break trials) on the kinematic and temporal
measures was tested in promise breakers. As previously reported
in the methods section, three of the twenty-four participants
in this group are not included in this analysis because they
never kept their promise (i.e., they do not have any keep
trials).
Interestingly, these analyses revealed no statistically significant
differences between keep and break trials in any of the kinematic
(MD: p = 0.50; AUC: p = 0.53) or temporal measures
(response time: p = 91; initiation time p = 0.83; motion time:
p = 0.93; Figures 7A,B; see Table 5 for detailed statistical
results). This means that in promise breakers, the cognitive
process associated with the decision whether to keep or break
a promise is likely to adhere to Pattern 3, indicating a similarly
strong conflict during both break and keep trials (compare
Figure 1).
Further, since the group of promise breakers is characterized
by a high degree of variability with respect to their return rate
(see Figure 5, red line), we focused on only those promise
breakers with a comparable number of both trial types (i.e.,
keep and break trials; compare Figure 5: participants 4–17 in
the group of promise breakers, red line, N = 14) in order
to ensure that the results obtained in the previous analyses
were not affected by the different number of promise breakers’
keep and break trials. Notably, the results of this comparison
TABLE 4 | Overview of the results of the mixed-effect models analyses testing the
effect of the group (promise keepers vs. promise breakers) on the kinematics and
temporal measures associated with keep trials of promise keepers and break trials
of promise breakers.
Group: Promise Keepers vs. Promise Breakers
Coeff. SE t value p-value
Maximum Deviation −0.12 0.05 −2.59 < 0.01
Area Under the Curve −0.13 0.04 −2.55 < 0.01
Response time −309.90 181.20 −1.71 0.09
Initiation time −75.91 72.76 −1.04 0.30
Motion time −230.80 154.70 −1.49 0.13
Coefficient estimates from mixed-effects models.
replicated those reported above. That is, we found no statistically
significant differences between keep and break trials in any of
the kinematics (MD: p = 0.39; AUC: p = 0.40) or temporal
measures (response time: p = 0.88; initiation time p = 0.89;
motion time: p = 0.83; Figures 7C,D; see Table 6 for detailed
results).
Finally, an additional set of analyses was conducted to test
whether the degree of cognitive conflict in promise breakers was
influenced by the frequency of promise keeping (return rate). To
this aim, two indices of cognitive conflict (break trials minus keep
trials, see Materials and Methods) were independently calculated
from the kinematics measures (i.e., MD and AUC) and used as
dependent variables in a robust regression with the return rate
as predictor. The results of these analyses showed no association
between the return rate and the kinematics indices in both MD
(β = 0.18, p = 0.42) and AUC (β = 0.17, p = 0.41). Thus,
these findings suggest that the frequency of promise keeping
in promise breakers does not have an impact on the conflict
experienced during keep and break trials, corroborating the
previous analyses.
Promise Stage
Although not the main focus of the study, we also analyzed
whether promise breakers and promise keepers already differed
in cognitive conflict dynamics during the promise stage, i.e.,
when they promised to always pay back the money. Due to
the same reasons as outlined above, we focused on the always
promises. We conducted linear regression analyses on the spatial
and temporal measures of mouse kinematics collected during
the promise decisions and used the group (i.e., promise keepers
vs. promise breakers) as a categorical predictor (fixed effect).
The results showed that the regression analyses did not reach
statistical significance in any of the dependent measures (MD:
β = −0.03, t = −0.75, p = 0.46; AUC: β = −0.04, t = −1.00,
p = 0.33; response time: β = −218.95, t = −1.05, p = 0.30;
initiation time: β = −37.38, −0.89, p = 0.38; motion time:
β = −174.72, t = −0.97, p = 0.34). These findings suggest
that promise keepers and promise breakers do not differ in
conflict dynamics during the promise decision. However, please
note that we are reluctant to further interpret these results
because the design was not optimized for the analyses of the
promise decisions. In particular, there are on average only six
“always” promise decisions per subject, which yields issues of
statistical power and reliability. Thus, these results should be
considered exploratory and should only be used to guide future
researchers.
DISCUSSION
Using mouse tracking we were able to continuously index
participants’ tentative commitments to two choice alternatives
during the decision of whether to keep or break a given
promise. We provide new evidence regarding different conflict
patterns of promise breakers and promise keepers. Interestingly,
promise breakers exhibited a strong conflict during their
decisions, regardless of whether they were keeping or breaking
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FIGURE 7 | (A) Results of the LMM analysis conducted to compare the MD associated with keep and break trials of promise breakers (N = 21). (B) Mean mouse
trajectories of keep (orange line) and break (red line) trials of promise breakers. (C) Results of the LMM analysis performed to compare the MD of keep and break
trials in a subset of promise breakers with a similar number of promise keep and promise break trials (N = 14). (D) Mean mouse trajectories of keep trials (orange line)
and break trials (red line) of this subset of promise breakers.
TABLE 5 | Overview of the results of the mixed-effect models analyses testing the
effect of response type (keep vs. break) on the kinematics and temporal measures
in promise breakers.
Response type
Coeff. SE t value p-value
Maximum Deviation −0.05 0.07 −0.67 0.50
Area Under the Curve −0.05 0.08 −0.62 0.53
Response time −23.23 195.04 −0.12 0.91
Initiation time 9.40 44.58 0.21 0.83
Motion time −34.33 388.50 −0.09 0.93
Coefficient estimates from mixed-effects models.
a promise (corresponding to Pattern 3 of Figure 1). This
suggests that they were always tempted by the non-selected
decision option regardless of whether they actually kept
or broke their promise. In contrast, promise keepers did
TABLE 6 | Overview of the results of the mixed-effect models analyses testing the
effect of response type (keep vs. break) on the kinematics and temporal measures
in promise breakers exhibiting a similar number of keep and break decisions
(N = 14).
Response type
Coeff. SE t value p-value
Maximum Deviation −0.06 0.07 −0.86 0.39
Area Under the Curve −0.06 0.07 −0.85 0.40
Response time −72.44 479.61 −0.15 0.88
Initiation time 14.23 105.91 0.13 0.89
Motion time −87.04 403.40 −0.22 0.83
Coefficient estimates from mixed-effects models.
not show any signs of conflict during keeping the promise
(corresponding to Pattern 1 of Figure 1). This suggests that
promise keepers were not tempted by the monetary gain
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associated with breaking the promise. Additionally, the fairly
straight trajectories exhibited by promise keepers suggest a
strong tendency toward keeping the promise. Since in the
present paradigm, participants were free to keep or break their
promises, it is not possible to obtain promise breaking decisions
from those participants who showed a strong preference for
keeping the promise. However, in line with the predictions
of Pattern 1, one would expect sharply edged trajectories for
decisions in which these participants (would have to) break their
promise.
Individuals who did not always keep their promise (i.e.,
promise breakers) exhibited a conflict, irrespective of whether
they broke or kept their promise. This conflict pattern allows
two different interpretations. On the one hand, one could argue
that the nature of conflict is different when promise breakers
keep and break a promise. When breaking a promise, they
might experience a moral conflict because they are aware of
the fact that they behave in an unfair manner. When keeping
a promise, they might experience an economic conflict because
they forego monetary benefits, i.e., they make a decision that
is against their economic self-interest. On the other hand, an
alternative interpretation could also be that the observed conflict
pattern reflects people’s indecisiveness. These two interpretations
are not necessarily incompatible, but can be reconciled since such
indecisiveness might be based on the same underlying decision
conflicts: a moral decision conflict when breaking the promise
and an economic decision conflict when keeping the promise.
However, the present study cannot exclude the possibility that
the cognitive conflict associated with the mouse trajectories
of promise breakers arises from aspects that are unrelated to
promise keeping or promise breaking behavior per se. That is, the
curved mouse trajectories exhibited by promise breakers in keep
and break trials cannot be undoubtedly interpreted as originating
from the desire to act in a fair manner or for monetary benefit,
respectively. Future investigations may be able to clarify this
point.
Further, if we had used a more traditional measure of conflict,
i.e., response times, our conclusions would be limited. First,
if we only had measured response time, we would not have
been able to detect the conflict in break trials. Second, there
are findings in our study where both the mouse trajectories and
the response time measure showed a similar negative finding,
that is, none of these measures differentiated between keep
trials and break trials in promise breakers. At first sight, this
indicates no advantage of mouse tracking. However, at second
sight, the advantage of mouse tracking becomes clear. Decisively,
in contrast to response time, mouse tracking is able to reveal
the psychological process while it unfolds during deliberation
(Spivey, 2007; Freeman et al., 2011a). In the present study, the
individual differences were manifest exactly in this unfolding
process. Only by analyzing the shape of the mouse trajectories,
we were able to learn that promise breakers have a conflict both
in keep and break trials, and thus ruling out the alternative
interpretation that there is no conflict at all in this group. If
we only had measured response time, we would not have been
able to differentiate these two interpretations. Together, these
findings suggest that although response time measures are often
an important and illuminating component of a decision, mouse
tracking measures seem to be able to capture additional variance
that is distinct from the variance revealed by response time
measures.
There are only very few previous studies examining the
phenomenon of promise breaking and keeping in a social
situation that involves real consequences and where participants
were free to keep or break the promise (Baumgartner et al.,
2009, 2013). Moreover, only one of these studies explored the
decision process of this phenomenon. This study used fMRI to
examine the neural correlate of promise breaking and keeping
(Baumgartner et al., 2009). In line with the current results,
the findings of this study suggested the existence of a conflict
during the act of breaking a promise by showing stronger
activation of brain regions that had been implicated in conflict
detection and resolution (anterior cingulate cortex, ACC and
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, DLPFC; Carter, 1998; Botvinick
et al., 1999, 2001; Miller and Cohen, 2001). Similar results have
been obtained in a related research field, i.e., deception/dishonest
behavior. A consistent finding of studies in this field (Priori
et al., 2008; Greene and Paxton, 2010; Kireev et al., 2017;
Sun et al., 2017, for a review see Abe, 2011) is that the
deceptive act goes along with increased activation of brain regions
involved in conflict detection and resolution, as the ACC and
DLPFC. Interestingly, some brain studies have also provided
evidence for the opposite pattern (e.g., Zhu et al., 2014; Maréchal
et al., 2017). For example, a study showed that patients with
damages to the DLPFC show less honest behavior compared
to patients with lesions in other areas and healthy subjects
(Zhu et al., 2014) and another study (Maréchal et al., 2017)
indicated that enhanced excitability of the DLPFC by means of
brain stimulation increases honest behavior compared to sham
stimulation and stimulation that reduced the excitability of the
DLPFC. Moreover, studies employing a behavioral approach have
shown similar discrepancies. While most studies demonstrated
that dishonest behavior was associated with increased reaction
times (e.g., Spence et al., 2001; Nuñez et al., 2005), there also exists
a number of behavioral studies that have reported the opposite
pattern of results (e.g., Shalvi et al., 2012; Tabatabaeian et al.,
2015; for a review see Bereby-Meyer and Shalvi, 2015). Although
speculative and only in a related research field, the findings of
the current study might help to understand the discrepancies
in the mentioned studies on dishonest behavior. By taking into
account different behavioral types (promise breakers vs. promise
keepers), we found evidence for different conflict dynamics in
different behavioral types. These divergent conflict dynamics
suggest that future studies on dishonest behavior could benefit
from an integrative perspective that takes different behavioral
types into account.
In sum, using mouse tracking, the current study is able to
elucidate the cognitive processes underlying the conflict, which
arises during the decision to keep or break a promise given
beforehand. Firstly, promise keepers displayed a significantly
smaller temptation by the dishonest option than did promise
breakers. Secondly, promise breakers were generally more
tempted by the non-chosen decision option and not specifically
by keeping or breaking their promise, as implicated by
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equally curved trajectories for promise keep and promise break
decisions. Hence, the present study provides the first objective
evidence that the conflict dynamics underlying the decision to
keep or break a promise is strongly shaped by inter-individual
differences.
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